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What Is a Merger?:
The Case for Taxing Cash Mergers Like Stock Sales
Jeffrey L. Kwall *
ABSTRACT
In a merger, neither the assets nor the stock of one corporation are physically
transferred to another corporation. Rather, the two corporations are unified by operation
of law. The absence of a physical transfer of assets or stock obscures the tax effects of a
merger. To determine these effects, a merger must be analogized to a sale of assets or a
sale of stock. These alternative analogies yield significantly different results when the
consideration for the merger is cash. When a cash merger is analogized to an asset sale, a
35% corporate tax is normally imposed. By contrast, no corporate tax normally results
when a cash merger is analogized to a stock sale. Mergers have long been taxed like asset
sales. Although analogizing cash mergers to asset sales was once defensible, changes in
the law have eroded all support for this treatment. More significantly, well-counseled
taxpayers can easily avoid the corporate tax resulting from the asset sale analogy. Thus,
the continued treatment of cash mergers as asset sales merely traps the unwary. If a cash
merger were instead analogized to a stock sale, the same tax consequences would apply
to all. To level the playing field, therefore, the asset sale analogy should be abandoned
and mergers should be taxed like stock sales.
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“There are few guideposts as to the true character of a cash merger. . . .” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Three alternative paths exist for transferring the business of one corporation
(“Target”) to another corporation (“Acquirer”). First, Target can transfer each of its
assets, by assignment or deed, to Acquirer. Second, each and every shareholder of Target
can assign to Acquirer the Target stock owned by that shareholder. Third, the parties can
dispense with a physical transfer of assets or stock, and instead merge Target into

1. I.R.S. Litig. Bulletin 89-4, 1989 WL 989256 (Apr. 1989).
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Acquirer, thereby uniting the two corporations by “operation of law.” 2
The corporate law of every state sanctions the merger of one corporation into
another. In a merger, the following events occur: 3
1. The stock of Target’s shareholders is converted to the consideration recited
in the merger agreement (normally stock of Acquirer and/or cash);
2. Acquirer becomes the owner of all the properties of Target and responsible
for all of Target’s obligations; and
3. The corporate existence of Target is extinguished. 4
Although the results of a merger are clear, the order in which these results occur is
not discernible. Based on state law, the end points seem to be reached by magic. Before
the merger, Target’s shareholders hold the stock of Target and Target holds assets and
bears liabilities. After the merger, the stock of Target’s shareholders has been
transformed into the consideration delineated in the merger agreement, the contents of
Target have shifted to Acquirer, and Target has disappeared. Clearly, Target’s
shareholders have disposed of their Target stock because they no longer own Target
stock. Just as clearly, Target has disposed of its assets because Target no longer owns
assets, nor does it even exist. It is impossible, however, to discern which disposition
occurred first because, as a matter of law, they occurred simultaneously.
From a corporate law standpoint, it does not matter whether a disposition of Target’s
stock or its assets occurred first because state law defines the rights and obligations of all
parties to a merger. 5 Likewise, from an income tax standpoint, it makes little difference
whether the first step in a merger is a stock transfer or an asset transfer if the
consideration is stock of Acquirer and the merger qualifies as a tax-deferred
reorganization. 6 When a merger is funded with cash, however, the order in which the
steps occur determines whether or not a 35% corporate tax is imposed on Target. 7 Target
will be taxed if the merger commences with the transfer by Target of its assets. 8 By

2. See generally HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 346 (3d ed. 1983).
3. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.07 (3d ed. Supp. 2005) [hereinafter MBCA]. The merger
laws of all states delineate the effects of a merger in similar terms.
4. This Article focuses on the merger of Target into Acquirer, in which Target is extinguished—a
transaction referred to as a “forward” merger. By contrast, when a “reverse” merger occurs, Target survives. For
a discussion of reverse mergers, see infra Part III.D.
5. See MBCA § 11.07.
6. If a substantial part of the consideration in a merger is stock of Acquirer, the merger can qualify as a
tax-deferred corporate reorganization. See infra note 55.
7. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1) (2000). A 34% rate applies to corporate income below $10,000,000 and lower rates
apply below $75,000. Target is assumed not to be an S corporation. See I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2000) (stating S
corporation generally is not a taxpaying entity).
8. I.R.C. § 1001 (2000) (providing that the sale of property causes any realized gain to be recognized in
absence of a nonrecognition provision). When Target is taxed, Acquirer is entitled to increase the basis of
Target’s assets to market value. See I.R.C. § 1012 (2000) (providing that buyer takes a cost basis in purchased
property). A sale of Target’s assets does not always trigger a corporate tax. If the basis of Target’s assets
exceeds their value, a deductible loss may result, and the basis of the assets is reduced to market value. See
I.R.C. § 165 (2000). Even when Target sells its assets at a gain, that gain might be absorbed by net operating
losses. See I.R.C. § 172 (2000). For purposes of this Article, the value of Target’s assets is assumed to exceed
the basis of its assets, and Target is assumed to have no net operating losses.
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contrast, Target will not be taxed if the initial step is the transfer by Target’s shareholders
of their stock. 9 Thus, the stakes are high. 10
To resolve the conundrum of whether Target’s stock or its assets are transferred
first, a fictional explanation of the merger must be adopted. Alternative fictions can be
devised that treat a merger as commencing with a transfer of Target’s stock (the “stock
transfer fiction”) or a transfer of Target’s assets (the “asset transfer fiction”). 11 The stock
transfer fiction does not cause Target to be taxed. 12 By contrast, the asset transfer fiction
triggers a tax on the gain in Target’s assets. 13 Unfortunately, neither fiction is strongly
supported by federal or state law. 14
Notwithstanding a dearth of authority for either fiction, the Internal Revenue Service
has embraced the asset transfer fiction for almost four decades. 15 This view of a merger
is accepted by the leading commentators and has become deeply ingrained in the mindset
of academics and practitioners. 16 Indeed, the asset transfer fiction has rarely been
questioned. 17
9. Target is not taxed when its shareholders sell their stock because Target has not transferred its assets.
See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (requiring sale or disposition of property to trigger taxable gain). Because Target is
not taxed when its stock is sold, the basis of its assets does not change. When Target’s stock is sold, an election
can be made that causes Target to be taxed on the gain in its assets and to increase the basis of its assets to
market value. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000); BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 10.42 (7th ed. 2002). The cost of the election (a corporate tax on
Target), however, normally outweighs the benefits (future tax savings from the increased basis in Target’s
assets) due to the time value of money. See JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND THEIR OWNERS 482-89 (3d ed. 2005).
10. To quantify the cost of taxing Target on the gain in its assets, the tax on Target must be reduced by the
present value of the future tax savings derived from the corresponding increased basis in Target’s assets. See
discussion supra note 9.
11. See infra Part II.
12. The stock transfer fiction entails two steps: 1) Target’s shareholders sell their stock to Acquirer, and 2)
Target distributes its assets to Acquirer. See infra Part II.A. The stock transfer fiction results in no tax to Target
and no change in the basis of Target’s assets. See discussion supra note 9.
13. The asset transfer fiction entails two steps: 1) Target sells all its assets to Acquirer, and 2) Target
distributes the consideration received from Acquirer to its shareholders. See infra Part II.B. The asset transfer
fiction taxes Target on the gain in its assets and increases the basis of those assets by a like amount. See
discussion supra note 8. Under both fictions, the Target’s shareholders are taxed on the gain in their stock (as a
result of the first step of the stock transfer fiction and the second step of the asset transfer fiction).
14. See infra notes 50-52; David J. Rachofsky, The Reorganization that Fails: Tax Consequences of an
Involuntarily Taxable Reorganization, 32d N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N. 639, 643 (1974) (noting “the
absence of authority directly in [sic] point” as to whether a merger commences with an asset transfer or a stock
transfer).
15. Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104. This view applies only to forward mergers, the focus of this Article.
See supra note 4. Reverse mergers are treated for tax purposes as stock transfers. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-564,
1974-2 C.B. 124; Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144.
16. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, at 10-86 (“Instead of purchasing the target company’s stock,
however, the acquirer corporation may purchase its assets . . . . This may occur by transfer of the assets pursuant
to a bill of sale or by merging the target into the acquirer for cash.”); MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN,
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS 3-3 (2006) (“IRS will view this taxable merger as if [Target] had sold
its assets to [Acquirer] . . . and as if [Target] had then undergone a complete liquidation.”).
17. But see John J. Clair, Accepted Reorganization Concepts After General Utilities Repeal–Familiar
Concepts in a Changed World, 69 TAXES 882 (1991) (“The Rev. Rul. 69-6 analysis has little to recommend it in
the . . . merger situation.”); Robert R. Tufts, The Taxable Merger, 7 J. CORP. TAX’N 342, 350 (1981)
(advocating sui generis treatment of taxable mergers); L.A. Bar Members Advocate Consistent Treatment for

KWALL FINAL.DOC

2006]

11/1/2006 2:25:35 PM

What Is a Merger?

5

Initial approval of the asset transfer fiction is not surprising in light of the legal
landscape that existed at the time. When this fiction was adopted, asset sales and stock
sales were taxed similarly. Target normally did not incur a tax, regardless of whether its
assets or its stock was sold. 18 Thus, the question of which fiction should apply to a cash
merger was not very important because the merger would be taxed similarly in either
case. Furthermore, when the asset transfer fiction was first adopted, the law then in effect
did not respect the separate steps of the stock transfer fiction (i.e., a stock sale followed
by a liquidation of Target). Rather, those steps were integrated into an asset purchase. 19
Hence, the asset transfer fiction offered the only substantive explanation of a merger at
this time. Finally, when the asset transfer fiction was adopted, the tax law governing
corporate acquisitions focused principally on Acquirer, not Target, and from Acquirer’s
perspective, the asset transfer fiction offers a superior explanation of a merger. 20 Hence,
it is not surprising that the government initially embraced the asset transfer fiction.
During the 1980s, however, dramatic changes in the law eroded the superiority of
the asset transfer fiction. First, the tax treatment of asset sales and stock sales diverged.
Now, Target is taxed when it sells its assets. 21 By contrast, Target is still not taxed when
its shareholders sell their stock. 22 Thus, the fiction invoked to explain a merger now
matters a great deal because it determines whether Target will be taxed. In addition, the
tax law no longer treats a stock purchase followed by a liquidation as an asset purchase. 23
Indeed, under current law, substance-over-form principles will never be applied to recast
a stock purchase followed by a liquidation as an asset purchase. 24 Hence, both fictions
now provide equally viable explanations of a cash merger. Finally, the tax law governing
corporate acquisitions no longer focuses only on Acquirer; but rather, focuses equally on
Acquirer and Target. 25 Although the asset transfer fiction still better explains a merger
from Acquirer’s perspective, the stock transfer fiction offers a superior explanation of a

Taxable Mergers, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 120-33 (June 10, 1992) [hereinafter L.A. Bar Members Report]
(questioning the inconsistent treatment of forward and reverse mergers).
18. See infra Part III.B.1. At this time, the “General Utilities rule” normally insulated Target from tax in
an asset sale. See Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935) (finding that corporation did
not recognize gain when it distributed appreciated property to its stockholders); see also I.R.C. §§ 311, 336(b),
337 (1954). For exceptions to the General Utilities rule, see infra note 62.
19. See infra Part III.B.2. At that time, the “Kimbell-Diamond doctrine” recast the purchase of Target’s
stock followed by a planned liquidation of Target into Acquirer as a purchase of Target’s assets. See KimbellDiamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74 (1950) (treating the purchase of the Target’s stock followed by the
pre-planned liquidation of Target as a purchase of Target’s assets), aff’d per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.
1951); see also I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (treating purchase of Target’s stock followed by liquidation of Target
within two years of stock purchase as an asset purchase).
20. See infra Part III.B.3.
21. See infra Part III.C.1. Congress repealed the General Utilities rule (supra note 18) in 1986. Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 631-33, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§
311, 336, 337).
22. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part III.C.2. The Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, supra note 19, was superseded by the enactment
of I.R.C. § 338 in 1982. See I.R.C. § 338 (1982); H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 536 (1982) (Conf. Rep.). Pursuant to
I.R.C. § 338, a tax on Target can be elected but the election is not normally made. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000);
supra note 9.
24. See infra Part III.C.2; see also Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (Situation 2).
25. See infra Part III.C.3.
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merger from Target’s perspective. 26 Hence, none of the elements that originally favored
the asset transfer fiction now exists.
The erosion of the asset transfer fiction’s superiority would not justify its rejection if
the adverse tax consequences of that fiction applied evenly to all taxpayers. However, the
tax now imposed on Target in a cash merger can easily be avoided, with the blessing of
the Internal Revenue Service, by well-counseled taxpayers who substitute two mergers
for one. 27 Hence, the prospect of a corporate tax in a cash merger now plagues only the
ill advised. 28
Current law’s disparate treatment of asset sales and stock sales necessarily thwarts
the tax policy goal of treating similarly situated taxpayers alike. 29 Ideally, Congress
should tax all corporate acquisitions alike regardless of their form, but the prognosis for
that reform is poor. 30 A far more realistic goal is to tax all cash mergers alike, regardless
of whether the parties utilize one merger or two mergers to achieve their objectives.
Unfortunately, continued adherence to the asset transfer fiction undermines this secondbest solution.
To equalize the tax treatment of all cash mergers, the stock transfer fiction should be
applied in lieu of the asset transfer fiction. By treating all cash mergers as commencing
with a stock transfer, cash mergers would be taxed the same as stock sales; Target would
not be taxed in either case. 31 Invoking the stock transfer fiction would level the playing
field by enabling all taxpayers contemplating a cash merger to avoid a tax on Target, not
just the well-advised.
Part II delineates the alternative fictions that might apply to a merger and
demonstrates that neither fiction provides an inherently superior explanation. Part III
discusses the government’s adoption of the asset transfer fiction, explains why the asset
transfer fiction was the superior alternative at the time, demonstrates the subsequent
erosion of that superiority and, finally, reveals how the continued application of the asset
transfer fiction traps only the unwary. Part IV explores alternative reform options.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING A MERGER: TWO VIABLE FICTIONS
Every state’s merger statute delineates the effects of a merger. Although these
statutes are not identical, they generally track the following language of the Model
Business Corporation Act:
When a merger becomes effective: . . .
(2) the separate existence of [the] corporation . . . merged into the survivor
ceases;
26. Id.
27. See infra Part III.D.
28. See L.A. Bar Members Report, supra note 17 (“[C]haracterization of a forward merger as a sale of
assets is only a trap for the unwary, and could easily be avoided by more sophisticated taxpayers.”).
29. The principle of horizontal equity, that taxpayers in similar positions should be treated equally, is
“perhaps the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation.” R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC
FINANCE 160, 173 (1959).
30. See infra Part IV.A.
31. If mergers were treated as commencing with a stock transfer, a tax on Target could be elected, but that
election would not normally be made. See discussion supra note 9.
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(3) all property owned by . . . [the] corporation . . . that merges into the survivor
is vested in the survivor without reversion or impairment;
(4) all liabilities of [the] corporation . . . merged into the survivor are vested in
the survivor; . . .
(8) the shares of [the] corporation . . . that are to be converted under the plan of
merger into shares, [money] . . . , or any combination of the foregoing, are
converted [to the consideration recited in the merger agreement] . . . . 32
No state’s merger statute prescribes an order in which these events occur. Rather, the
events occur simultaneously upon the effective date of the merger.
To determine whether Target is taxed in a cash merger, an order must be imposed on
the consequences of the merger. Two different fictions can be employed to establish that
order: the “stock transfer fiction,” which treats the merger as commencing with a transfer
of Target’s outstanding stock, and the “asset transfer fiction,” which treats the merger as
commencing with a transfer of Target’s assets. Each of these fictions entails the transfer
of both Target’s stock and its assets; the difference between the fictions is the order in
which these transfers occur.
Under the stock transfer fiction (see ILLUSTRATION 1):
1) Target’s shareholders transfer all their stock to Acquirer in exchange for the
merger consideration, and
2) Target, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Acquirer, then distributes all its assets
and liabilities to Acquirer and dissolves.

ILLUSTRATION 1: STOCK TRANSFER FICTION
Shareholders
Step 1
Target Stock
Consideration
T

A
Step 2
Assets & Liabilities
T

32. MBCA § 11.07. The merger statute of every state provides for similar effects.
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By contrast, under the asset transfer fiction (see ILLUSTRATION 2):
1) Target transfers all its assets and liabilities to Acquirer in exchange for the merger
consideration, and
2) Target then distributes the merger consideration to its shareholders and
dissolves. 33
ILLUSTRATION 2: ASSET TRANSFER FICTION
Shareholders
Step 2
Consideration
Step 1
Assets & Liabilities

T

Consideration

A

Neither fiction represents events that actually transpire in a merger. Rather, the
fictions provide artificial explanations of a merger, where an explanation is needed to
determine whether Target is taxed.
A. Stock Transfer Fiction
When a corporate acquisition is structured as a stock transfer, Target’s shareholders
transfer their stock (by assignment) to Acquirer in exchange for consideration (usually
money or Acquirer stock). Each shareholder of Target decides independently whether to
transfer his or her shares. In a merger, by contrast, none of the Target shareholders can
retain any Target stock. For a stock transfer to simulate a merger, therefore, every Target
shareholder must transfer all of his or her Target shares to Acquirer (see ILLUSTRATION
3). 34

33. An alternative asset transfer fiction would be to treat Target as distributing its assets and liabilities to
its shareholders and then treat those shareholders as transferring the assets and liabilities to Acquirer in
exchange for the merger consideration. This view is inconsistent with the legal reality that, when a merger
occurs, Target’s shareholders are neither entitled to its assets nor exposed to its liabilities. See MBCA § 11.07.
Hence, this alternative is not a viable explanation of a merger.
34. If a limited number of recalcitrant Target shareholders exist when Acquirer attempts to purchase stock,
those shareholders might be compelled to surrender their shares under a “share exchange statute.” See infra
notes 150-154 and accompanying text. The stock transfer fiction, however, envisions the voluntary transfer of
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ILLUSTRATION 3: FIRST STEP OF STOCK TRANSFER FICTION
Shareholders
Target Stock
Consideration

T

A

In both a stock transfer and a merger, Target’s shareholders receive consideration
directly from Acquirer. Moreover, neither a stock transfer nor a merger exposes Target’s
shareholders to its liabilities. When Target’s shareholders transfer their stock, they
remain divorced from Target’s liabilities because Target, as a corporate entity with its
contents intact, gravitates to Acquirer. 35
When Target’s shareholders transfer all their stock to Acquirer, Target remains in
existence, holding all its assets and liabilities as a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Acquirer. 36 In these circumstances, it is common for Acquirer to retain Target as a
wholly-owned subsidiary, rather than cause Target to liquidate 37 and dissolve. 38 For
example, this holding company structure might be desired to insulate Acquirer’s assets
from claims against Target. In a merger, however, Target always disappears and its assets
and liabilities shift to Acquirer. For a stock transfer to simulate a merger, therefore,
Target must liquidate and dissolve. 39
In summary, a corporate acquisition structured as a stock transfer differs from a
merger in two ways. First, when Acquirer offers to acquire Target’s outstanding stock,
recalcitrant Target shareholders can refrain from surrendering their shares, an option that
does not exist in a merger in which all stock of Target is transformed by operation of law.
Second, when Acquirer purchases all the stock of Target, Target need not liquidate and
dissolve. For a stock transfer to simulate a merger in which Target is extinguished,
however, Target must liquidate and dissolve. Though imperfect, the stock transfer fiction
is a viable explanation of a merger. The next question is whether the asset transfer fiction
is equally viable.

all Target shares.
35. See supra ILLUSTRATION 1.
36. Id.
37. Liquidation is a tax law concept that entails the distribution of all the corporation’s assets to its
shareholders. See I.R.C. §§ 331, 336 (2000).
38. Dissolution is a corporate law concept that entails the voluntary filing of documents with the state to
terminate the corporation’s existence. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 14.01-.05.
39. See supra ILLUSTRATION 1, Step 2. Alternatively, when the stock of Target is held by Acquirer, Target
can be merged upstream into Acquirer. See, e.g., MBCA § 11.05. The asset transfer fiction assumes that Target
is liquidated rather than merged, because one merger cannot be explained by another merger.
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B. Asset Transfer Fiction
When a corporate acquisition is structured as an asset transfer, Target conveys its
assets (by assignment or deed) to Acquirer in exchange for consideration which Acquirer
transfers to Target. In addition to tangible consideration, Acquirer can assume some, or
all, of Target’s liabilities. 40 Thus, Acquirer can pick and choose among both Target’s
assets and its liabilities. In a merger, however, Acquirer absorbs the entire contents of
Target by operation of law. 41 For an asset transfer to simulate a merger, therefore, Target
must convey all of its assets and Acquirer must assume all of Target’s liabilities (see
ILLUSTRATION 4). Even if Acquirer assumes all of Target’s liabilities, Target’s exposure
to those claims is not eliminated. Unless Target’s creditors affirmatively release Target,
Target will remain contingently liable for all claims. 42
ILLUSTRATION 4: FIRST STEP OF ASSET TRANSFER FICTION
Shareholders

Assets & Liabilities

T

Consideration

A

Just as the transfer of all of Target’s outstanding stock to Acquirer is insufficient to
simulate a merger, 43 the mere transfer of all of Target’s assets and liabilities to Acquirer
does not simulate a merger either. After Target transfers its assets and liabilities to
Acquirer, Target remains in existence and holds the consideration provided by
Acquirer. 44 In a merger, however, Target disappears and the consideration reaches the
hands of Target’s former shareholders. For an acquisition structured as an asset transfer
to simulate a merger, therefore, Target must liquidate by distributing the consideration
received from Acquirer to Target’s shareholders and then dissolve. 45 By contrast, when
Target actually sells its assets, Target is not compelled by law to liquidate and dissolve,
though it normally will do so. 46

40. When Acquirer purchases Target’s assets, Acquirer may be exposed to certain Target liabilities such
as products liability claims, environmental clean-up liabilities, and pension liabilities, regardless of whether
Acquirer expressly assumes these liabilities. See WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 4892.75 (discussing circumstances where Acquirer can be held liable for torts
of Target without expressly assuming liability), 7122 (discussing application of successor liability doctrine to
environmental clean-up actions) (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990 & Supp. 2004).
41. Of course, any assets of Target not wanted by Acquirer might be distributed by Target in advance of a
merger.
42. When Acquirer assumes a liability of Target, Acquirer becomes primarily liable because Target has
the right to recover from Acquirer if Target’s creditors collect from Target. In the absence of a novation,
however, Target’s creditors retain the right to proceed against Target. See FLETCHER, supra note 40, § 7116.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39 .
44. See supra ILLUSTRATION 4.
45. See supra ILLUSTRATION 2, Step 2.
46. Target normally liquidates after selling its assets, unless it plans to enter a new business. Typically,
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When Target liquidates after selling its assets, Target’s shareholders receive the
consideration provided by Acquirer, subject to any residual claims against Target. 47 In a
merger, by contrast, Target’s shareholders are not exposed to any of the former Target’s
liabilities. 48 Thus, the asset transfer fiction deviates from one of the fundamental effects
of a merger, namely, the insulation of Target’s shareholders from all liabilities of Target.
In summary, an acquisition structured as an asset transfer differs from a merger in
several ways. First, in an asset transfer, Acquirer can pick and choose among the assets it
takes from Target. In a merger, by contrast, Acquirer receives all of Target’s assets by
operation of law. Moreover, in an asset transfer, Acquirer can pick and choose the
liabilities it assumes from Target. In a merger, however, all liabilities shift to Acquirer by
operation of law. In addition, when assets are transferred, Target is not compelled to
liquidate and dissolve. But in a merger, Target is extinguished. Finally, when Target
liquidates after transferring its assets, Target’s shareholders are residually exposed to
Target’s liabilities. By contrast, when a merger occurs, Target’s shareholders are
insulated from Target’s liabilities.
For the most part, acquisitions structured as stock transfers and asset transfers
deviate from mergers in similar ways. Unlike a merger, stock transfers and asset transfers
accommodate partial transfers; a stock transfer accommodates the transfer of less than all
of Target’s stock, and an asset transfer accommodates the transfer of less than all of
Target’s assets and liabilities. In addition, a stock transfer and an asset transfer can end
after stock or assets are transferred; a liquidation and dissolution of Target is not
mandated in either case. In a merger, by contrast, the separate existence of Target
necessarily terminates. Asset transfers differ from stock transfers and mergers, however,
in one significant respect. When Target is liquidated after an asset transfer, Target’s
shareholders are residually exposed to Target’s liabilities, a result that occurs neither in a
merger nor when Target is liquidated after a stock transfer.
Both the stock transfer fiction and the asset transfer fiction offer imperfect
explanations of a merger. The asset transfer fiction offers a weaker explanation, however,
because that fiction causes Target’s shareholders to be exposed to its liabilities, a result
that does not transpire from a merger or the stock transfer fiction. Nevertheless, the
government has consistently applied the asset transfer fiction to a cash merger. Part III
explores the justification for that treatment.

Target’s shareholders wish to take possession of the proceeds of the sale of a corporate business, even though
the act of liquidation normally triggers a shareholder tax. See I.R.C. § 331 (2000) (stating that distributions in a
complete liquidation are treated as received in exchange for stock). Even if Target’s shareholders were averse to
paying this tax, the threat of corporate penalty taxes normally induces a liquidating distribution. See I.R.C. §§
531 (accumulated earnings tax), 541 (personal holding company tax) (2000).
47. The shareholders are liable as transferees for any claims against Target to the extent of the liquidation
proceeds. See I.R.C. § 6901 (2000). Moreover, Target’s shareholders are contingently liable for any Target
liabilities assumed by Acquirer (to the same extent that Target would have been liable for such claims had
Target not liquidated). HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 382.
48. If, however, a Target shareholder had contractually guaranteed a liability of Target, that shareholder
would remain exposed in the unlikely event the guarantee was not released before the merger.
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III. ASSET TRANSFER FICTION WAS ONCE
DEFENSIBLE BUT IS NOW A TRAP FOR THE UNWARY
For almost four decades, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has consistently applied
the asset transfer fiction to a cash merger. At first, the tax law could be seen as supporting
this treatment. This support has been eroded, however, by dramatic legislative changes
during the 1980s. 49 Under current law, the asset transfer fiction mandates a tax on Target
that can easily be avoided by well-counseled taxpayers. Hence, continued use of the asset
transfer fiction penalizes only the unwary.
A. Administrative Adoption of Asset Transfer Fiction
Neither common law, 50 nor state corporate law, 51 nor federal tax law 52 strongly
49. I.R.C. §§ 311, 336, 338 (2000).
50. A Supreme Court case involving a federal stamp tax is often cited as authority for favoring the asset
transfer fiction; however, that case did not address a merger. See Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. United States,
296 U.S. 60 (1935) (treating certain asset sales as triggering a stamp tax to Target, but, although a merger also
occurred, the merger was not before the Court). Various lower courts nevertheless applied the Raybestos
holding to mergers. See, e.g., Am. Processing & Sales Co. v. Campbell, 164 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1947) (imposing
the stamp tax on Target in a merger); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 480 F.2d 807 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
(imposing the stamp tax on Target in a merger). But see Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. United States, 317 F.2d 598
(5th Cir. 1963) (refusing to impose transfer tax on Target in a merger due to Texas law governing life insurance
companies).
In West Shore Fuel, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.2d 1236, 1242 (2d Cir. 1979), the court refrained from
addressing the global question of whether a merger should be conceptualized as commencing with an asset
transfer or a stock transfer, and instead resolved the taxpayers’ inconsistent positions by relying on a factual
analysis. The court found that, based on the unique facts of the case, “the transaction here, although carried out
through the medium of a merger, in substance was a sale of assets followed by a liquidation, not a direct sale of
stock by shareholders . . . .” For criticism of West Shore Fuel, see Tufts, supra note 17, at 350.
51. The evolution of state laws involving mergers, asset transfers and stock transfers proceeded along
separate paths. At common law, corporations could not merge. As time passed, industry specific merger laws
were enacted. By the late 1800s, merger statutes of general applicability began to appear. See generally Nelson
Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of Corporate Combination Law: Policy Issues and Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 687, 695-96, 746-47 (1998) (describing evolution of corporate combinations in Delaware, New Jersey,
North Carolina, and the Model Business Corporation Act); Comment, Statutory Merger and Consolidation of
Corporations, 45 YALE L.J. 105, 109-10 (1935) (discussing how statutes authorizing mergers have evolved
from industry-specific statutes to general statutes). Cash mergers were not allowed until 1925, when Florida
first permitted such mergers. Elliot J. Weiss, The Law of Take-Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 632 (1981). Every state now has a merger statute and all but Alaska permit cash mergers,
but none delineate a specific order for the consequences of a merger. See MBCA § 11.02 (comparing states’
statutes).
In contrast to mergers, asset transfers have always been based on contractual agreements between the
corporate parties. Comment, supra note 51, at 107. Today, all states have statutes delineating the necessary
procedures to carry out an asset sale focusing principally on shareholder consent. See FLETCHER, supra note 40,
§ 2949.20 (noting that all states have statutes that govern the sale of assets by a corporation). Regarding stock
transfers at common law, one corporation was generally not permitted to purchase stock in another corporation.
All states now allow one corporation to hold stock in another corporation. Id. §§ 2825, 2832.
52. No Internal Revenue Code provision addresses a cash merger. In the case of a merger that qualifies as
a tax-deferred reorganization, neither the definitional provision nor the corporate tax-deferral provision reveals
any indication of Congress’s conception of a merger. See I.R.C. § 361 (2000) (nonrecognition rule that applies
to the target corporation in a reorganization); § 368(a)(1)(A) (statutory merger can be treated as a
reorganization). A 1954 Code provision delineating the secondary effects of certain reorganizations; namely,
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favors either of the fictions that might be used to explain a cash merger. The income tax
regulations confirm that the tax consequences of a merger occur simultaneously. 53 This
view undermines the legitimacy of any fiction attempting to order the consequences of a
cash merger. Nevertheless, the IRS has consistently applied the asset transfer fiction to a
cash merger.
The IRS first publicly applied the asset transfer fiction to a cash merger in 1969. In
Revenue Ruling 69-6, 54 a stockholder-owned savings and loan association merged into a
non-stock (depositor-owned) savings and loan association. Savings accounts in the nonstock institution served as the consideration for the merger. The principal issue was
whether savings accounts constituted permissible consideration for the merger to qualify
as a tax-deferred reorganization. 55 The IRS ruled that the savings accounts were
impermissible consideration for a reorganization and, therefore, treated the merger as a
taxable cash merger. 56
After a painstaking analysis of whether the merger qualified as a reorganization, the
ruling summarily states: “[t]he transfer [by Target] of all of its assets to [Acquirer] will
be considered a sale by [Target] of all of its assets to [Acquirer].” 57 By treating the

the shifting of Target’s historic tax attributes to Acquirer, can be seen as applying the asset transfer fiction to
certain mergers. See I.R.C. § 381(a)(2) (2000) (awkward provision implicating the asset transfer fiction by
suggesting that corporate tax-deferral provision (section 361) can apply to certain mergers). When enacting
section 381, Congress focused on drafting a provision broad enough to capture a merger; any subsidiary effects
of the drafting effort (including the implicit adoption of the asset transfer fiction) was likely unintended. See
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337. Section 381 was designed to
enable the successor corporation to step into the ‘tax shoes’ of its predecessor corporation without
necessarily conforming to artificial legal requirements which now exist under court-made law.
Tax results of reorganizations are thereby made to depend less upon the form of the transaction
than upon the economic integration of two or more separate businesses into a unified business
enterprise. At the same time the new provision makes it difficult to escape the tax consequences of
the law by means of a legal artifice such as . . . merger into another corporation.
Id. Even if Congress viewed certain mergers qualifying as reorganizations through an asset transfer fiction lens,
no indication exists that Congress viewed a cash merger through that same lens. Indeed, it is unlikely that
Congress even contemplated the implications of a cash merger on Target while the General Utilities rule
applied. See infra Part III.B.1.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)(ii) (2006).
54. Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104. The view had previously been applied to mergers that qualified as
tax-deferred reorganizations. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-326, 1967-2 C.B. 143 (analyzing forward triangular
merger as a type “C” reorganization, a transaction that commences with a transfer of Target’s assets to
Acquirer).
55. For a merger to qualify as a tax-deferred reorganization, certain common law requirements must be
satisfied including the continuity of proprietary interest doctrine. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2000) (including
statutory merger in the definition of reorganization); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1 (2001) (delineating common law
continuity of proprietary interest, continuity of business enterprise and business purpose requirements). To
satisfy the continuity of proprietary interest requirement, a substantial part of the consideration must constitute
“stock” of Acquirer. See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (continuity requirement
satisfied when Acquirer stock represented 38% of the consideration). A non-stock savings and loan association
cannot issue stock.
56. The ruling held that no proprietary interest in a mutual savings and loan is deep enough to constitute
stock thereby rendering the merger taxable. The Supreme Court subsequently upheld this view. See Paulsen v.
Comm’r, 469 U.S. 131 (1985).
57. Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104, 105.
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merger as commencing with an asset sale, the IRS implicitly invoked the asset transfer
fiction. 58 The ruling offers neither supporting authority nor an explanation of why a cash
merger should be viewed as commencing with an asset sale. 59 Even the IRS has privately
conceded the dearth of authority and the absence of a rationale for this view. 60
Nevertheless, the IRS has consistently adhered to this position. 61
In light of the law governing asset sales and stock sales in 1969, the IRS’s casual
adoption of the asset transfer fiction to explain a cash merger is not surprising. At that
time, the asset transfer fiction represented a superior explanation of a cash merger. Part
II.B explores the sources of this superiority.
B. Superiority of Asset Transfer Fiction Prior to the 1980s
When Revenue Ruling 69-6 surfaced, the law governing taxable acquisitions was
conducive to the adoption of the asset transfer fiction. Asset sales and stock sales were
generally taxed alike. Thus, the choice of a fiction for explaining a cash merger did not
matter very much. More importantly, the steps of the stock transfer fiction were not
accorded independent effect. Thus, the asset transfer fiction was the only viable choice
for explaining a cash merger. Finally, the tax law governing corporate acquisitions
focused principally on the buyer during this period and, from the buyer’s perspective, the
asset transfer fiction provides a superior explanation of a merger. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the IRS initially embraced the asset transfer fiction.
1. Neutral Tax Treatment of Asset Sales and Stock Sales
The IRS’s casual invocation of the asset transfer fiction in Revenue Ruling 69-6 can
largely be explained by the neutral tax treatment accorded asset sales and stock sales
during this period. If Target sold its assets and then liquidated, Target would generally
not be taxed under the well-known General Utilities rule. 62 Although Target was not
taxed, Acquirer was nevertheless entitled to increase the basis of Target’s assets to
market value. 63 If, instead of selling its assets, Target’s shareholders sold their stock,

58. See supra Part II (demonstrating that the asset transfer fiction commences with the transfer of Target’s
assets to Acquirer).
59. The ruling supports its finding with the following obtuse reference: “See section 1.368-1(b) of the
regulations which provides in part that a sale is nevertheless to be treated as a sale even though the mechanics of
a reorganization have been set up.” Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104, 105.
60. See I.R.S. Litig. Bull. 89-4, 1989 WL 989256 (Apr. 1989) (“There are few guideposts as to the true
character of a cash merger. . . . Rev. Rul. 69-6 offers no rationale for its conclusion that the cash merger was an
asset sale . . . .”); I.R.S. Nondocketed Serv. Adv. Rev. 8938, 1989 WL 1172948 (1989) (expressing similar
sentiment).
61. For recent applications, see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 200628008 (Mar. 28, 2006); 200606009 (Feb.
10, 2006); 200214016 (Apr. 5, 2002).
62. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). If, within twelve months of adopting a
plan, Target sold its assets, liquidated, and met certain other requirements, Target was accorded nonrecognition
treatment. See I.R.C. § 337 (1954). Certain exceptions existed to the General Utilities rule. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§
1245, 1250 (1954) (establishing that gain attributable to certain depreciation deductions is always recognized);
Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 401 (1983) (finding tax benefit rule overrides General Utilities
rule in certain circumstances).
63. I.R.C. § 1012 (1954).
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Target would not incur a tax. 64 When Target’s stock was purchased, however, Acquirer
could increase the basis of Target’s assets to market value by liquidating Target. 65
Hence, regardless of whether a cash merger was explained by the asset transfer fiction
(i.e., as an asset sale followed by the liquidation of Target) or by the stock transfer fiction
(i.e., as a stock sale followed by the liquidation of Target), the same tax consequences
normally resulted. Specifically, no corporate tax was imposed on Target, and the basis of
Target’s assets was increased to market value.
Revenue Ruling 69-6 treated a cash merger as commencing with an asset sale. 66
Because an asset sale alone does not extinguish Target’s existence, the ruling by
necessity then treated Target as liquidating. 67 Moreover, the ruling explicitly
acknowledged that by viewing the merger as a sale of Target’s assets followed by the
liquidation of Target, the General Utilities rule insulated Target from tax. 68
Consequently, it is clear that the IRS did not expect the asset transfer fiction to cause
Target to be taxed.
Due to the neutral tax treatment of stock sales and asset sales, the IRS could have
invoked either fiction to explain a cash merger without creating controversy. The IRS had
previously applied the asset transfer fiction to mergers that qualified as tax-deferred
reorganizations. 69 Hence, it was logical for the IRS to extend that fiction to cash mergers.
2. Stock Sales Recharacterized as Asset Sales
A more compelling reason for the IRS to have favored the asset transfer fiction
stems from the tax treatment of stock sales. When Acquirer purchased Target’s
outstanding stock and, within two years, liquidated Target, the stock purchase was recast
as an asset purchase pursuant to the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine. 70 This doctrine enabled
Acquirer to treat a stock purchase as an asset purchase simply by liquidating Target.
When these events occurred, the basis of Target’s assets was increased to market value, 71
but no tax was imposed on Target. 72 Thus, it was common practice for a corporate
purchaser of Target’s stock to liquidate Target with the objective of enjoying a tax-free
increase in the basis of Target’s assets.

64. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1954) (requiring sale or disposition of property to trigger a taxable gain).
65. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (treating purchase of Target’s stock followed by liquidation of Target within
two years as an asset purchase). For further discussion, see infra Part III.B.2.
66. See supra text accompanying note 57.
67. Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104, 105.
68. Id. “Since [Target] will be dissolved, [the merger consideration] will be distributed to [Target]
shareholders in complete liquidation of [Target. Target] may avail itself of the provisions of section 337 of the
Code if the liquidation meets the requirements of that section.” Id. The “provisions of section 337” sanctioned
the deferral of Target’s tax. See supra note 62.
69. See supra note 54.
70. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff’d per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.
1951). Under this common law doctrine, asset purchase treatment was contingent on a finding that the stock
sale and subsequent liquidation were part of a unified plan. In 1954, Congress modified the doctrine to mandate
asset purchase treatment when a stock purchaser liquidated Target within two years of the stock purchase,
regardless of whether the subsequent liquidation was part of a plan. See I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954).
71. See I.R.C. § 1012 (1954) (conferring cost basis on Target’s assets).
72. See I.R.C. § 336 (1954). Under current law, a liquidating subsidiary still does not recognize gain or
loss. See I.R.C. § 337 (2000).
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In light of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, the asset transfer fiction offered the only
viable explanation of a cash merger. If the stock transfer fiction were applied to a merger,
the merger would be treated as commencing with a purchase of Target’s stock. This
fictional stock purchase would be followed immediately by the liquidation of Target
because Target is extinguished in a merger. These events (i.e., the purchase of Target’s
stock followed by the liquidation of Target) would have been recast as an asset purchase
under the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine. 73 Hence, if the stock transfer fiction had been
applied to a cash merger at this time, the fictional sale of Target’s stock and the
subsequent liquidation of Target into Acquirer would have been taxed as an asset
purchase.
By virtue of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, the steps in the stock transfer fiction
were not respected as independent events but were instead integrated into an asset
purchase. Thus, the asset transfer fiction served as the only viable explanation for a cash
merger. It is not surprising, therefore, that the IRS embraced the asset transfer fiction.
3. Focus on Buyer Reinforced the Asset Transfer Fiction
In addition to undermining the substance of the stock transfer fiction, the KimbellDiamond doctrine likely fostered the view that a cash merger commenced with an asset
sale for a more subtle reason. During this period, the tax consequences to Target were
generally benign regardless of whether its assets or its stock was sold. When Target sold
its assets, the threat of tax was minimized by the pervasive General Utilities rule. 74 This
treatment was contingent on Target liquidating, but the liquidation of Target routinely
followed the sale of its business. 75 Thus, Target’s favorable tax treatment generally
resulted from the normal course of events. 76
By contrast, when the shareholders of Target sold their stock, the Kimbell-Diamond
doctrine mandated that Acquirer execute a discretionary action, the liquidation of Target,
to achieve its favorable tax treatment. When Acquirer purchased Target’s stock, Acquirer
could increase the basis of Target’s assets to market value only by liquidating Target. 77
Otherwise, the basis in Target’s assets would not change. Hence, the spotlight was on
Acquirer to make a business decision that was far from routine. In many instances,
Acquirer might have preferred to operate Target as a wholly-owned subsidiary. 78 Yet,
not liquidating Target would deprive Acquirer of the tax benefits offered by the KimbellDiamond doctrine. This quandary affected only Acquirer. Regardless of whether Target
was liquidated, Target was not treated as selling its assets. 79

73. See supra ILLUSTRATION 1 (steps in stock transfer fiction). Because Target is extinguished in the
merger, the liquidation step of the stock transfer fiction occurs immediately after the stock purchase.
74. See supra Part III.B.1.
75. See supra note 46.
76. For Target to achieve nonrecognition treatment, certain corporate formalities were required, including
the adoption of a plan of liquidation before the asset sale. See I.R.C. § 337 (1954).
77. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954).
78. For example, Acquirer was not exposed to Target’s liabilities when Target was operated as a
subsidiary, rather than liquidated into Acquirer. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
79. Dallas Downtown Dev. Co. v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 114 (1949); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,267, 1973
WL 34,293 (Mar. 14, 1973) (“[T]he Kimbell-Diamond doctrine has historically been applied only to the
acquiring corporation . . . and has been held not to require a recasting of the transaction with respect to the
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The Kimbell-Diamond doctrine’s focus on the buyer may have reinforced the view
that the asset transfer fiction is a superior fiction for explaining a merger. When a merger
is examined from the buyer’s perspective, the asset transfer fiction provides the more
efficient means for conceptualizing the transaction. The asset transfer fiction is more
efficient than the stock transfer fiction because it achieves the end result of a merger in
one step, rather than two. The first step of the asset transfer fiction shifts Target’s assets
and liabilities to Acquirer. 80 At that point, Acquirer is in the same position as if Target
had merged into Acquirer. For an asset sale to simulate a merger, Target must also
liquidate. 81 The liquidation is necessary for Target’s shareholders to reach the end point
of a merger, but it has no bearing on Acquirer.
The stock transfer fiction is not as compelling from Acquirer’s perspective as the
asset transfer fiction. After the first step of the stock transfer fiction, Acquirer holds
Target’s stock, not Target’s assets and liabilities as it would in a merger. 82 It is only after
Target is liquidated into Acquirer that the end point of a merger is achieved. 83 Hence,
from Acquirer’s perspective, the stock transfer fiction requires two mechanical steps. By
contrast, the asset transfer fiction achieves the end result of a merger after a single step.
Because the asset transfer fiction is more economical, it could logically be seen as the
superior explanation of a merger during the reign of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine.
It is difficult to assess whether the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine’s focus on the buyer
indeed reinforced widespread faith in the asset transfer fiction. 84 In light of the high level
of confidence in a fiction with no inherent superiority, however, intangible influences
must have been lurking beneath the surface. 85 Otherwise, one would suspect that the
asset transfer fiction would have been subjected to greater scrutiny after the tax law’s
support for this fiction eroded. As will be seen, however, even after the disappearance of
the elements that supported the asset transfer fiction, allegiance to that fiction has not
wavered.
C. Erosion of Asset Transfer Fiction’s Superiority
The asset transfer fiction’s apparent superiority has been eroded by dramatic
changes in the law. The General Utilities rule was repealed, thereby eliminating the
uniform tax treatment of asset sales and stock sales. In addition to the repeal of the
General Utilities rule, the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine has been superseded. Finally, the
tax law governing corporate acquisitions is no longer principally focused on the buyer
acquired corporation . . . and its shareholders.”) (citations omitted).
80. See ILLUSTRATION 4.
81. See ILLUSTRATION 2.
82. See ILLUSTRATION 3.
83. See ILLUSTRATION 1.
84. Corporate law might also be seen as disproportionately focused on the buyer, thereby reinforcing the
tendency to conceptualize a merger pursuant to the asset transfer fiction. When Target is disposed of in a
merger, its shareholders remain fully protected from all claims against Target. See supra Part II. Hence, postmerger claimants must pursue their claims against Acquirer. This focus of post-merger litigation on Acquirer
might also be fueling the tendency to conceptualize a merger from the buyer’s perspective.
85. The tendency to conceptualize a merger as an asset transfer, rather than a stock transfer, might also
stem from the fact that the destination of Target’s assets in a merger is obvious (namely, Acquirer). By contrast,
the destination of the stock of Target’s shareholders in a merger is unclear. See infra note 116 and
ILLUSTRATION 5.
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when a stock purchase occurs. Hence, none of the factors that previously favored the
asset transfer fiction now exist.
1. Disparate Treatment of Asset Sales and Stock Sales
Congress repealed the General Utilities rule in 1986. 86 Now when Target sells its
assets, Target is taxed on any resulting gain 87 and Acquirer increases the basis of
Target’s assets to market value. 88 By contrast, when the shareholders of Target sell their
stock, Target is not taxed on the gain in its assets, unless an election is made to tax
Target. 89 Moreover, the basis of Target’s assets is not increased to market value after a
stock purchase, unless the election to tax Target is made. 90 Hence, the tax consequences
of a stock sale now mirror those of an asset sale only when the requisite election to tax
Target is made. Normally, this election will not be made because the cost of the current
tax on Target generally exceeds the future tax savings derived from an increase in the
basis of Target’s assets. 91 Thus, under current law, Target is taxed when its assets are
sold but not when its stock is sold.
Now that asset sales and stock sales are taxed differently, the alternative fictions for
explaining a cash merger lead to different tax consequences. If the asset transfer fiction
applies, the first-step asset sale triggers a tax to Target and a corresponding increase in
the basis of Target’s assets. 92 The asset transfer fiction thus mandates a tax on Target, a
result not anticipated when Revenue Ruling 69-6 was issued. 93 By contrast, if the stock
transfer fiction applies, Target is not taxed and the basis of Target’s assets does not
change. 94 Thus, the IRS’s casual invocation of the asset transfer fiction to explain a cash
merger can no longer be rationalized as a meaningless choice.
2. Stock Sales Are Never Recharacterized as Asset Sales
When Revenue Ruling 69-6 was issued, the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine validated the
asset transfer fiction. 95 That doctrine was superseded in 1982, however, when Congress
enacted an elective tax regime for stock purchases. Since that time, when Acquirer
purchases Target’s stock, Target generally is not taxed and the basis of Target’s assets
does not change, regardless of whether Target is liquidated. However, Acquirer may elect
to treat the stock purchase as an asset purchase. 96 If the election is made, Target is

86. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 631-633, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. §§ 311, 336, 337).
87. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2000) (mandating recognition of realized gains unless a nonrecognition provision
applies).
88. I.R.C. § 1012 (2000).
89. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000) (permitting corporate purchaser of Target’s stock to elect to treat Target as
selling and repurchasing its assets in a taxable transaction), discussed supra at Part III.B.2.
90. Id. § 338.
91. See supra note 9.
92. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1012 (2000). See ILLUSTRATION 4 (first step in asset transfer fiction).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
94. These consequences result unless asset sale treatment is elected. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000) (stating that if
Acquirer elects asset sale treatment, Target is treated as selling and repurchasing its assets).
95. See supra Part III.B.2.
96. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000).
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deemed to sell its assets and then repurchase them. 97 Under current law, the deemed sale
triggers a current tax to Target, and the deemed repurchase increases the basis of Target’s
assets to market value. 98 Although the elective regime enables a stock purchaser to
simulate the tax consequences of an asset purchase, the election is rarely made because
asset purchase treatment normally results in higher tax costs. 99
The elective regime for stock purchases was intended to coordinate any increase in
the basis of Target’s assets with the imposition of a tax on Target. 100 The tax treatment
now depends on an election, rather than the requirement of the Kimbell-Diamond
doctrine that Target be liquidated. 101 The government, however, remained concerned that
remnants of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine might support a claim that a stock purchase
followed by the liquidation of Target could still permit the basis of Target’s assets to be
increased without Target being taxed. 102 To eliminate this possibility, the IRS ruled in
1990 that a stock purchase followed by the liquidation of Target will never be recast as an
asset purchase, unless the requisite election to treat the stock purchase as an asset
purchase is made by Acquirer. 103
The foregoing events injected substance into the stock transfer fiction’s explanation
of a cash merger. When the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine applied, the stock transfer fiction
(i.e., the purchase of Target’s stock followed by the liquidation of Target) always resulted
in asset purchase treatment. 104 Because the individual steps of the stock purchase fiction
were not respected, the asset transfer fiction provided the only viable explanation for a
cash merger. By contrast, after 1990, the stock purchase fiction never results in asset
purchase treatment in the absence of an election to the contrary. Under current law,
therefore, the individual steps of the stock transfer fiction are generally respected. Hence,

97. Id.
98. See I.R.C. §§ 1001 (providing that the sale of property causes any realized gain to be recognized
unless a nonrecognition provision applies), 1012 (providing that the buyer takes a cost basis in purchased
property) (2000). Prior to the repeal of the General Utilities rule in 1986, the deemed sale normally did not
trigger a tax to Target. See I.R.C. § 337 (1954). Therefore, from 1982 (when section 338 was enacted) until
1986 (when the General Utilities rule was repealed), the section 338 election was generally desirable because it
permitted an increase in the basis of Target’s assets without triggering a tax to Target. After the repeal of the
General Utilities rule, however, elective asset purchase treatment was generally shunned because the increase in
basis came at the cost of a current tax on Target. See supra note 9.
99. See supra note 9. The section 338 election is still desirable when Target has a net operating loss
carryover that will absorb the gain on the fictional sale of Target’s assets. See I.R.C. § 172(a) (2000) (allowing a
deduction for net operating loss carryovers). In this situation, the basis of Target’s assets is increased without a
tax on Target. In addition, a special election that may be made under prescribed conditions is also generally
desirable. See I.R.C. § 338(h)(10) (2000). This special election substitutes a tax on the gain in Target’s assets
for the tax on the gain in Target’s shareholders’ stock. As a result, the basis of Target’s assets is increased to
market value at the cost of a tax on Target, in lieu of the tax on Target’s shareholders that would otherwise be
imposed. For further discussion of § 338(h)(10), see KWALL, supra note 9, at 505-06.
100. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 600, 632 (1982) (Conf. Rep.) (“[S]ection 338 was intended to replace
any nonstatutory treatment of a stock purchase as an asset purchase under the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine.”).
101. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, ¶ 12-73-74 (“Where the parent has recently purchased . . . the
stock of a subsidiary for cash in order to obtain the sub’s assets, . . . a basis step-up . . . now may be
accomplished without an actual liquidation (but at the price of full gain or loss recognition inside the sub) [by
making the election] under § 338.”).
102. See supra Part III.B.2.
103. Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (Situation 2).
104. See supra Part III.B.2.
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the two fictions now stand on equal footing and offer equally viable explanations of a
merger.
3. Attention to Seller Reinforces the Stock Transfer Fiction
Prior law governing taxable acquisitions focused on the buyer, from whose
perspective the asset transfer fiction provides a more compelling explanation of a cash
merger. 105 Current law, however, focuses equally on seller and buyer. When an asset sale
occurs now, the seller is taxed and the buyer increases the basis of the acquired assets to
market value. 106 When a stock sale occurs, current law’s elective regime allows for a
deemed sale of assets, triggering a tax to the seller, and a deemed repurchase, increasing
the basis of Target’s assets. 107 Because prior law focused principally on the buyer, the
asset transfer fiction offered a superior explanation of a merger. Now that the seller
shares the spotlight, the stock transfer fiction is equally compelling.
From the seller’s perspective, the stock transfer fiction is the superior explanation of
a merger because it achieves the end result in a more economical fashion than the asset
transfer fiction. When Target’s shareholders transfer their stock to Acquirer, the
consideration provided by Acquirer immediately reaches those shareholders. 108 At that
point, Target’s former shareholders are in the same position as if Target merged into
Acquirer. For a stock transfer to simulate a merger, however, Target must subsequently
liquidate into Acquirer. 109 The liquidation is necessary to simulate the end point of a
merger for the buyer, but it has no bearing on the seller.
The asset transfer fiction is not as compelling from the seller’s perspective as the
stock transfer fiction. After Target transfers all of its assets, its shareholders continue to
hold Target stock, not the consideration they would receive from Acquirer in a
merger. 110 When an asset transfer occurs, Target must distribute the consideration
received from Acquirer to Target’s shareholders to achieve the end point of a merger. 111
Hence, from the seller’s perspective, the asset transfer fiction reaches the result of a
merger in two steps, whereas the stock transfer fiction requires only one step. Thus, by
virtue of its economy, the stock transfer fiction can be seen as the superior explanation of
a merger from the seller’s perspective.

105. See supra Part III.B.3.
106. See I.R.C. §§ 1001 (providing that the sale of property causes any realized gain to be recognized
unless a nonrecognition provision applies), 1012 (providing that the buyer takes a cost basis in purchased
property) (2000).
107. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000) (providing for election of asset sale and repurchase treatment); supra Part
III.C.2. Although “seller’s” tax is technically imposed on Target after the stock of Target is held by Acquirer,
the cost of the tax is normally extracted by Acquirer from Target’s shareholders through a reduction in purchase
price. Specifically, the price Acquirer will pay for Target’s stock generally represents the price Acquirer would
have paid for Target’s assets, reduced by the tax that would have been triggered to Target if its assets had been
sold. See KWALL, supra note 9, at 485-89.
108. See ILLUSTRATION 3.
109. See ILLUSTRATION 1.
110. See ILLUSTRATION 4.
111. See ILLUSTRATION 2.
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Due to dramatic changes in the tax law, any bias that previously existed toward the
buyer’s perspective of a merger can no longer be rationalized. Under current law, the
perspectives of both seller and buyer command equal attention. From the seller’s
perspective, the stock transfer fiction offers the more logical explanation of a merger.
Because current law focuses equally on the seller and the buyer, neither party’s
perspective should dominate the tax law’s view of a merger.
D. Asset Transfer Fiction Is a Trap for the Unwary
All the factors that previously favored the asset transfer fiction have disappeared.
The mere loss of the asset transfer fiction’s superiority, however, does not justify its
rejection. Rather, the asset transfer fiction is arguably entitled to deference for serving as
the foundation for a uniform government policy over the past four decades. 112 Taxpayers
have come to rely on this position, and its clarity provides desirable predictability. Hence,
the asset transfer fiction should be abandoned only if it now has adverse effects.
The asset transfer fiction has indeed become problematic. The tax the asset transfer
fiction imposes on Target can easily be circumvented with a substantively equivalent
transaction sanctioned by the government. Thus, the asset transfer fiction now serves as a
trap for the unwary and for those who mistakenly believe that their merger qualifies as a
tax-deferred reorganization. 113

112. See Alan Cathcart, More on Reverse Triangular Mergers, 64 TAX NOTES 130 (1994) (acknowledging
“uniform policy of the IRS to treat a statutory merger as the acquisition by the survivor of the assets of the
merged corporation”). In reality, the policy is not all that uniform. See I.R.S. Litig. Bull. 89-4, 1989 WL 989256
(Apr. 1989) (“It is not necessarily the Service’s position that all cash mergers constitute asset sales.”).
113. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Comm’r, 469 U.S. 131 (1985) (finding that a merger of a stock savings and loan
into a mutual savings and loan did not qualify as a tax-deferred reorganization because it violated the continuity
of proprietary interest requirement); Honbarrier v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 300 (2000) (finding that a merger of one
trucking company into another trucking company failed to qualify as a tax-deferred reorganization because it
violated the continuity of business enterprise requirement).
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Since 1990, the IRS has sanctioned a relatively simple route for escaping the tax
imposed on Target in a cash merger. 114 By substituting two mergers for one, the parties
can achieve the end results of a cash merger while securing the tax consequences of a
stock sale. Although mergers are still employed to effectuate the acquisition, no corporate
tax is imposed on Target unless an election is made. 115 In lieu of a single forward merger
of Target into Acquirer (see ILLUSTRATION 5), 116 the tax on Target can be avoided by
utilizing two mergers: a “reverse” merger followed by an “upstream” merger.

ILLUSTRATION 5: FORWARD MERGER
Shareholders
Consideration
Target
Stock

T

Contents of Target

A

114. See Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (Situation 2); Treas. Reg. § 1.338-3(d) (2003).
115. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000) (providing for election of asset sale treatment); supra Part III.C.2.
116. The thick arrows in ILLUSTRATIONS 5-7 are intended to convey the operation of law effects of a
merger, in contrast to the thin arrows in ILLUSTRATIONS 1-4 that depicted actual physical transfers of property,
stock and money. In ILLUSTRATION 5, the destination of the arrow attached to the stock of Target’s shareholders
is not known. Those subscribing to the stock transfer fiction would regard Acquirer as the destination; those
who favor the asset transfer fiction would regard Target as the destination. As demonstrated in Part II, the actual
destination of Target’s stock will inevitably remain a mystery because it is converted to the consideration
delineated in the merger agreement by operation of law.
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To effectuate a reverse merger (see ILLUSTRATION 6), Acquirer first forms a new
subsidiary (“S”) and S is then merged into Target. Target’s shareholders receive the same
cash consideration as in a forward merger of Target into Acquirer. Unlike a forward
merger where Target is extinguished, however, Target survives the reverse merger as a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Acquirer and S is extinguished. 117
ILLUSTRATION 6: REVERSE MERGER
Shareholders
Consideration

Target Stock

T

A
S

Contents of S
After the reverse merger, Acquirer owns all the Target stock. Hence, the reverse
merger is substantively equivalent to a stock purchase (the purchase of Target’s stock by
Acquirer) and is taxed accordingly. 118 As such, no tax is imposed on Target unless an
election to the contrary is made. 119

117. See FLETCHER, supra note 40, at § 6970.149 (explaining reverse mergers).
118. See Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (treating a reverse merger as a qualified stock purchase); Treas.
Reg. § 1.338-3(d) (2003) (implementing Rev. Rul. 90-95). Unlike a stock purchase, however, a reverse merger
offers the corporate law convenience of a merger obviating the need to persuade every shareholder to tender
shares. Of course, modern share exchange statutes now often provide convenience comparable to a merger. See
infra text accompanying notes 150-154.
119. Target will be taxed if asset sale treatment is elected under I.R.C. section 338, but that election will not
normally be made. See supra notes 9, 99.
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The reverse merger alone does not reach the end point of a forward merger of Target
into Acquirer. To reach that end, a second merger, the upstream merger of Target into its
parent, Acquirer, must occur (see ILLUSTRATION 7). This upstream merger is taxed as a
liquidation and, therefore, neither Target nor Acquirer is taxed. 120 Consequently, by
utilizing two mergers instead of one, the same end results are achieved. However, by
utilizing mergers treated as a stock sale and liquidation, the tax on Target is avoided.
ILLUSTRATION 7: UPSTREAM MERGER

A
Contents of Target

T
Under normal circumstances, substance-over-form principles would cause the two
mergers to be integrated into a single forward merger, thereby negating circumvention of
the asset transfer fiction and resulting in the imposition of a tax on Target. 121 However,
the government has ruled that a purchase of Target’s stock (here effectuated through a
reverse merger), followed by the liquidation of Target (here effectuated through an
upstream merger), will never be recast as an asset purchase. 122 Hence, the government
has effectively provided a roadmap for avoiding the tax on Target in a cash merger. 123

120. See I.R.C. §§ 332, 337 (2000) (conferring nonrecognition treatment on both corporations when a
subsidiary is liquidated into its parent); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.332-2(d), (e) (1955). Unlike a liquidation, however, an
upstream merger offers the corporate law convenience of shifting ownership of assets by operation of law,
rather than by utilizing documents of conveyance. For tax purposes, however, both transactions are treated
alike. No tax is imposed on Target in either case.
121. The common law step-transaction doctrine, a variant of the substance-over-form principle, permits a
series of formally separate steps to be amalgamated and treated as a single transaction. Courts employ various
tests to determine whether a sufficient factual connection exists to integrate the individual steps. In Rev. Rul.
90-95, the requisite factual connection existed between the reverse merger and the upstream merger to apply the
step-transaction doctrine. See Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (acknowledging that state law prohibited
Acquirer from owning the stock of Target, thereby necessitating the upstream merger). For a more detailed
overview of the step-transaction doctrine, see Jeffrey L. Kwall & Kristina Maynard, Dethroning King
Enterprises, 58 TAX LAW. 1, 11-15 (2004).
122. See Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (Situation 2) (stating that the step-transaction doctrine will not be
applied to treat a purchase of Target’s stock followed by its liquidation as a purchase of Target’s assets); Treas.
Reg. § 1.338-3(d) (2003) (implementing Rev. Rul. 90-95). For a variation on the theme of Rev. Rul. 90-95, see
GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 16, at 8-43 (delineating mechanics for substituting two mergers for forward
triangular merger).
123. The government adopted this position to ensure that the basis of Target’s assets could not be increased
to market value unless the gain in Target’s assets was taxed. See infra Part IV.
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The cost of substituting two mergers for one is normally small relative to the tax on
Target that it avoids. 124 Consequently, Target will be taxed in a cash merger only when
the parties fail to substitute an indirect path for a direct one. 125 Perpetuating the asset
transfer fiction in this environment smacks of unfairness and creates a compelling case
for reform.
In summary, it is not surprising that the IRS invoked the asset transfer fiction to
explain a cash merger in 1969. However, all the elements previously supporting the asset
transfer fiction have since disappeared, and that fiction now imposes a corporate tax that
can easily be avoided with the government’s blessing by all but the unwary.
Consequently, the tax treatment of cash mergers should be reformed. Part IV will explore
alternative reform options.
IV. REFORM OPTIONS
Under current law, the three techniques for acquiring a corporate enterprise lead to
different tax consequences. When Target sells its assets, a tax on Target is mandated.
When the stock of Target is sold, a tax on Target is elective. When Target is acquired in a
cash merger, a tax on Target is mandated but that tax can easily be avoided by
substituting two mergers for one.
Ideally, the tax system should not influence the business decision of how to structure
an acquisition. 126 This ideal cannot be achieved as long as the alternative acquisition
techniques are subjected to disparate tax treatment. Congress could neutralize the ill
effects of current law by mandating that all taxable acquisitions be taxed uniformly,
regardless of form. 127 Disparate tax treatment has existed for more than two decades,
however, and it is unlikely that Congress will remedy this situation in the foreseeable
future.
Due to the poor prognosis for comprehensive reform, a second-best solution that
rectifies the problematic treatment of cash mergers is desirable. Specifically, the IRS
should reject the asset transfer fiction and apply the stock transfer fiction to cash mergers.
This change in policy would render the tax on Target in a cash merger elective, thereby
eliminating the trap that now exists for taxpayers who fail to substitute two mergers for
one.

124. See Glen A. Kohl & Lea Anne Storum, M&A Double Take: Why Two Mergers Are Better than One, 5
THE M&A LAW. No. 7 (2002) (“Generally it will not be difficult to interpose a reverse triangular merger in an
otherwise forward structure.”).
125. See supra note 28.
126. When a tax causes an economic decision to be made differently from how it would have been made in
the absence of the tax, the taxpayer generally bears a burden in excess of the tax itself. The tax creates an
inefficiency because it makes one person worse off without conferring a corresponding benefit on anyone else.
See R. MUGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 291-312 (4th ed. 1984)
(explaining excess burden and its impact on economic efficiency).
127. Even greater systemic benefits would be derived by extending uniformity to acquisitions currently
qualifying as tax-deferred reorganizations, but those transactions are beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., 99TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON SUBCHAPTER C (Comm. Print 1985)
(proposing to provide uniform tax treatment for all corporate acquisitions, regardless of form and regardless of
whether cash or stock of Acquirer serves as the consideration).
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A. Restoring Neutral Tax Treatment to Asset Sales and Stock Sales
Congress could eliminate the tax system’s influence on the form of a corporate
acquisition by taxing asset sales and stock sales uniformly. If that result were achieved,
the question of whether the asset transfer fiction or the stock transfer fiction should apply
to a cash merger would be relegated to an academic inquiry. Regardless of which fiction
applied, all taxable acquisitions would be taxed alike, and tax considerations would no
longer influence their structure.
Three alternative systems might be employed to restore neutral treatment to asset
sales and stock sales. First, Congress might mandate a tax on Target in all cases and
correspondingly, an increase in the basis of Target’s assets to market value. 128 Under
current law, this approach is manifested by the treatment of asset sales and of those stock
sales for which the election to tax Target is made. 129 To extend this treatment to all stock
sales, the tax on Target must be mandatory, rather than elective. If Target were taxed in
all asset sales and all stock sales, Target would also be taxed in all cash mergers,
regardless of which fiction was invoked.
Rather than mandating a tax on Target in all cases, the second alternative would be
for Congress to take the opposite approach. Specifically, Target might be relieved from a
current tax in all asset sales and all stock sales and, correspondingly, be required to retain
the historic basis in its assets. 130 These ends are achieved by current law when a stock
sale occurs and no election to tax Target is made. 131 To extend this system to all stock
sales, Congress would need to repeal the mechanism to elect a tax on Target. In the case
of asset sales, Congress would need to enact legislation insulating Target from tax. 132 If
Target were relieved from tax in asset sales and stock sales, Target would likewise not be
taxed in a cash merger regardless of which fiction applied.
Finally, rather than implementing a mandatory tax system, Congress’s third
alternative would be to permit the parties to an asset sale or a stock sale to elect whether
Target should be taxed. 133 If the tax were elected, the basis of Target’s assets would be
adjusted to market value. By contrast, if the tax were not elected, the basis of Target’s

128. See James Lewis, A Proposal for a Corporate Level Tax on Major Stock Sales, 37 TAX NOTES 1041
(1987) (proposing that Target be taxed regardless of whether its assets or its stock is sold); see also Lori Farnan,
A Mandatory Section 338: Can It Be Implemented?, 42 FLA. L. REV. 679 (1990) (advancing guidelines for a
mandatory tax on Target when its stock is sold). Target would be taxed and the basis of its assets would be
increased only if the market value of Target’s assets exceeds their basis. If the basis of Target’s assets exceeds
their market value, a loss would be triggered and basis would be reduced to market value. This Article generally
assumes that the value of Target’s assets exceeds the basis of its assets.
129. I.R.C. §§ 338, 1001, 1012 (2000).
130. See Glenn E. Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal for Uniform Mandatory Rules, 44
TAX L. REV. 145 (1989). Another version of this alternative would be to resurrect the General Utilities rule and
forego a corporate tax while permitting a step-up in asset basis to market value. See supra Part III.B.1.
Assuming that the resurrection of the General Utilities rule would result in a significant loss of tax revenue,
restoration of that rule seems highly unlikely.
131. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000) (permitting corporate purchaser of Target’s stock to elect to treat Target as
selling and repurchasing its assets).
132. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 337 (1954) (noting prior law that insulated Target from tax when it sold its assets
and other requirements were satisfied).
133. See STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., 99TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON SUBCHAPTER C (Comm. Print 1985).
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assets would not change. Current law treats stock sales in this manner. 134 To extend this
treatment to asset sales, Congress must enact legislation permitting the parties to an asset
sale to elect whether Target is taxed. If both stock sales and asset sales were subject to an
elective regime, the tax treatment of cash mergers would also be elective regardless of
which fiction applied. If Congress implemented this elective system, all cash acquisitions,
regardless of form, would be taxed consistently.
The disparate tax treatment of asset sales and stock sales has existed since the repeal
of the General Utilities rule more than two decades ago. 135 During this period, Congress
has shown no interest in restoring uniformity to the tax treatment of taxable acquisitions.
Moreover, no reason exists to be optimistic about major tax reform occurring in the
foreseeable future. 136 Hence, a less comprehensive solution to the problems posed by the
tax treatment of cash mergers should be pursued to increase the likelihood of
implementation.
B. Applying the Stock Transfer Fiction to Cash Mergers
If Congress refrains from taxing asset sales and stock sales alike, all cash mergers
should be taxed alike, regardless of whether two mergers are substituted for one. At first
blush, it would appear that this end could be achieved in either of two ways. First, the
asset transfer fiction might be extended to two-step mergers (i.e., a reverse cash merger
followed by an upstream merger) in an effort to tax Target even when two mergers are
substituted for one. Alternatively, the asset transfer fiction might be abandoned and the
stock transfer fiction would instead be applied to all cash mergers. On more careful
reflection, however, the only viable option is to abandon the asset transfer fiction because
expanding that fiction would make matters worse. If the asset transfer fiction were
extended to two-step mergers, the current disparity in tax treatment when two mergers are
substituted for one would be exacerbated. 137
Currently, when a reverse cash merger is followed by an upstream merger, the IRS
respects the separate steps and the reverse merger is taxed as a stock sale. 138 As such, the
reverse merger is subjected to current law’s elective regime that governs stock sales. 139
Specifically, the basis of Target’s assets is increased to market value only if a tax on
Target is elected. 140 In the absence of such an election, the basis in Target’s assets does
not change. Although a tax on Target is not mandated in a two-step merger, a link exists
between any increase in the basis of Target’s assets and a tax on Target.
134. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000) (providing that purchase of Target’s stock impacts the basis of Target’s assets
only if Acquirer elects asset purchase treatment).
135. See supra Part III.C.1.
136. On November 1, 2005, President Bush’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform submitted two
comprehensive tax reform proposals to the Treasury Department. Since the panel’s report was delivered “tax
reform seems to have fallen off the President’s radar screen. Never mind the back burner—tax reform doesn’t
appear to even be in that warming drawer at the bottom of the stove.” Robert J. Wells, Bush on Tax Reform, 110
TAX NOTES 565 (2006).
137. If the asset transfer fiction were applied to two-step mergers, the basis of Target’s assets might be
increased without the imposition of a tax on Target, thereby violating a fundamental tenet of current law. See
infra text accompanying notes 141-145.
138. See Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (Situation 2); supra Part III.D.
139. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000); supra Part III.C.2.
140. Id. § 338.
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If the asset transfer fiction were applied to two-step mergers, the two mergers would
be integrated into an asset purchase. 141 As a result, current law’s elective regime would
not apply. 142 Instead, the integrated transaction would presumably be governed by a
common law which supports an increase in the basis of Target’s assets to market
value. 143 No common law authority exists, however, to impose a tax on Target in these
circumstances. 144 Consequently, if the asset transfer fiction were extended to two-step
mergers, the link that now exists between an increase in the basis of Target’s assets and a
tax on Target would be broken. As a result, taxpayers could potentially enjoy an
increased basis in Target’s assets without a corresponding tax on Target. 145 Hence,
applying the asset transfer fiction to two-step mergers could augment, rather than
eliminate, the disparity in tax treatment when two mergers are substituted for one.
The only viable approach for taxing all cash mergers alike, therefore, is to abandon
the asset transfer fiction. A tax on Target in a cash merger should not be mandated.
Instead, the stock transfer fiction should apply to all cash mergers, and any tax on Target
should be elective. To achieve this end, Revenue Ruling 69-6 should be overruled and
new IRS guidance should be issued that applies the stock transfer fiction to cash mergers.
By treating a cash merger as commencing with a stock purchase, current law’s elective
regime would apply to cash mergers. 146 Under this system, Target will not be taxed in a
cash merger and the basis of its assets will not change, unless an election to tax Target is
made.
Although substituting the stock transfer fiction for the asset transfer fiction modifies
a longstanding ruling position, it would not adversely affect taxpayers who desire the tax
consequences of Revenue Ruling 69-6. 147 Those taxpayers could still achieve the same
results simply by making the requisite election for asset sale treatment. 148 Less
sophisticated taxpayers, as well as taxpayers who fail in an attempt to qualify a merger as
a tax-deferred reorganization, will no longer be burdened by an avoidable tax on
Target. 149 In effect, an existing trap is eliminated without disrupting the benefits derived

141. See supra Part II.B (delineating asset transfer fiction).
142. I.R.C. § 338 (2000) (elective regime applies only to a stock purchase, not to an asset purchase).
143. See Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74 (1950) (treating the purchase of the
Target’s stock followed by a pre-planned liquidation of Target as a purchase of Target’s assets), aff’d per
curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951); supra Part III.B.2. Although much of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine was
superseded, see supra Part III.C.2, remnants remain. See generally Don W. Bakke, Dusting Off KimbellDiamond: The Continued Viability of the Asset Acquisition Doctrine for Non-Corporate Purchasers, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1443 (2002) (identifying areas where the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine might still be applied).
144. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
145. In effect, taxpayers could achieve the results of the General Utilities rule (no tax on Target and an
increased basis in Target’s assets) more than two decades after that rule was repealed. See supra Parts III.B.1,
III.C.1. Congress could of course enact legislation that would eliminate this possibility.
146. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000).
147. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
148. See I.R.C. § 338 (2000).
149. See supra note 113. For an example in the tax law of reversing a system that mandated an election to
achieve a result normally desired by less sophisticated taxpayers by making the desired result the norm, see
I.R.C. § 453 (2000) (causing the installment method of reporting gain to apply automatically to any sale in
which at least one payment is to occur in a later year, unless the taxpayer elects in the year of sale not to apply
the installment method, resulting in a reversal of the rules that applied prior to 1980); Martin D. Ginsburg,
Future Payment Sales After the 1980 Revision Act, 39 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N § 43.01 (1981).
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from a longstanding ruling position.
Further justification for applying the stock transfer fiction to mergers at this point in
time can be derived from the proliferation of state “share exchange” statutes. 150 In a
share exchange, Target and Acquirer enter into an agreement that, with shareholder
approval, causes the stock of Target’s shareholders to be converted by operation of law to
the consideration recited in the share exchange agreement. 151 These share exchange
statutes extend the corporate law benefits of a merger to stock acquisitions by enabling
Acquirer to secure the stock of recalcitrant Target shareholders by operation of law.152
Share exchanges are taxed as stock purchases, notwithstanding their substantive
similarity to a cash merger. 153 Hence, as state law erodes the distinctions between stock
transfers and mergers, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify tax law distinctions. 154
Some might object to the apparent inconsistency of applying the stock transfer
fiction to cash mergers and the asset transfer fiction to those mergers qualifying as taxdeferred reorganizations. 155 The application of the asset transfer fiction to mergers
qualifying as tax-deferred reorganizations predates its application to cash mergers. 156
While it is superficially appealing to apply a uniform analysis to taxable and non-taxable
mergers, analytical disparities between taxable acquisitions and tax-deferred
reorganizations have always existed. Moreover, the IRS has reinforced these disparities

150. See MBCA § 11.03. The only states that have not enacted share exchange statutes are Delaware,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.
151. See MBCA § 11.07(b) (effect of a share exchange). To accomplish a share exchange, the boards of
Target and Acquirer negotiate an agreement and submit the proposal to a vote of each corporation’s
shareholders. If the proposal is approved by the percentage mandated by the statute, all Target shares are
transferred to Acquirer by operation of law.
152. Mergers and share exchanges are governed by the same section or consecutive sections of most
statutes. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 11.02 (mergers), 11.03 (share exchanges).
153. Share exchanges are taxed as stock purchases when any cash consideration is utilized. If all the
consideration is in the form of Acquirer stock, the share exchange could qualify as a tax-deferred
reorganization. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2000). Although share exchange statutes originally confined the
permissible consideration to stock of Acquirer, modern statutes normally permit cash and many other forms of
consideration. See, e.g., MBCA § 11.03(a)(1) (including “cash” as permissible consideration).
154. For an example of the tax law adapting to the breakdown of state law distinctions, see Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-3(a) (1996) (taxing most non-publicly traded, unincorporated enterprises with at least two owners as
partnerships, unless the enterprise elects to be taxed as a corporation). This regulation was promulgated in
response to the enactment of limited liability legislation by every state in the late twentieth century that
eliminated the most significant state law differences between a corporation and an unincorporated enterprise.
See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, §
1.2 The Emergence and History of LLCs (1992 & supp. 2005). Prior to 1996, an unincorporated enterprise was
taxed as a corporation if it possessed certain characteristics historically attributed to corporations. See Larson v.
Comm’r, 66 T.C. 159 (1976) (applying the corporate resemblance test), acq. in result, 1979-1 C.B. 1. The 1996
regulations reflect the government’s acknowledgment that it was no longer sensible for the tax law to
distinguish partnerships from corporations based on characteristics no longer unique to the corporate form.
Applying the stock transfer fiction to both forward and reverse cash mergers would likewise offer the benefit of
eliminating a tax law distinction with no foundation in corporate law. See L.A. Bar Members Report, supra note
17 (“From a legal viewpoint, the corporate mechanic of which of the merger participants survives the merger
appears to be a formalistic determinative factor without any economic consequences.”).
155. The asset transfer fiction has long been applied to mergers that qualify as tax-deferred reorganizations.
See supra note 53; Rev. Rul. 72-343, 1972-2 C.B. 213. The proposal in this Article would not change that
result.
156. See supra note 54.
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precisely in this area by limiting its position of not integrating two-step mergers to those
instances where integration results in a taxable transaction. 157 When the integration of a
two-step merger results in a tax-deferred reorganization, the IRS still applies substanceover-form principles in a traditional fashion and integrates the steps into a
reorganization. 158 Hence, no logical impediment exists to utilizing different fictions for
explaining taxable and tax-deferred mergers.
Applying the stock transfer fiction to taxable mergers represents only a partial
solution to the disparate tax treatment of taxable corporate acquisitions. Although this
proposal establishes elective tax treatment for stock sales and cash mergers, a mandatory
tax on Target would still occur in an asset sale. 159 The resulting tax system would
discourage taxpayers from utilizing asset sales when that acquisition technique might
otherwise be desired. Nevertheless, the proposed policy change advances fairness and
achieves a desirable incremental reform.
If neither Congress nor the Treasury acts to rationalize the treatment of cash
mergers, it is only a matter of time before the government’s assertion of a corporate tax in
a cash merger will be challenged. A court might question the propriety of mandating a tax
on Target in a cash merger due to the absence of a readily identifiable taxable event 160
and reject Revenue Ruling 69-6 as unreasonable. 161 If this occurred, the resulting
uncertainty regarding how a cash merger should be conceptualized would likely impede
the flow of corporate acquisitions. Hopefully, a legislative or administrative solution will
emerge before that day arrives.
V. CONCLUSION
A merger occurs by operation of law, not by mechanical steps. Thus, no one can
authoritatively say whether a cash merger should be conceptualized as commencing with
an asset sale or a stock sale. As such, no inherent justification exists for favoring one
explanation of a merger over another for tax purposes. Nonetheless, because
fundamentally different tax consequences now result from asset sales and stock sales, a
cash merger must be viewed as one or the other to ascertain its tax effects.
The government has long treated a cash merger as commencing with an asset sale.
When that view was articulated, asset sales and stock sales were accorded similar tax
treatment. Thus, the government could not possibly have contemplated the implications
of its asset sale view in a world where fundamental differences exist between the tax

157. See Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (Situation 2); see also supra Part III.D.
158. See Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-42 I.R.B. 321 (integrating reverse merger and subsequent upstream
merger where resulting transaction qualifies as a tax-deferred reorganization); Treas. Reg. 1.338-3(d) (2003).
159. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2000).
160. See Paulsen v. Comm’r, 469 U.S. 131, 151 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause a transaction
that is a sale rather than a tax-deferred exchange at the shareholder level cannot qualify as a tax-deferred
reorganization at the corporate [Target] level, . . . the result of the Court’s holding is to discourage an entire
class of legitimate business transactions without regard to the desirability of such mergers from an economic
standpoint. This result is directly contrary to the intent of Congress. . . .”).
161. A revenue ruling merely represents the position of the IRS—it has neither the effect of law nor even
the weight of a regulation. See Geisinger Health Plan v. C.I.R., 985 F.2d 1210, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[C]ourts
are to give weight to IRS revenue rulings but may disregard them if they conflict with the statute they purport to
interpret or its legislative history, or if they are otherwise unreasonable.”).

KWALL FINAL.DOC

2006]

11/1/2006 2:25:35 PM

What Is a Merger?

31

treatment of asset sales and stock sales.
Continuing to treat a cash merger as an asset sale results in uneven treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers, thereby offending basic notions of fairness. Ideally,
Congress should eliminate the disparate treatment of asset sales and stock sales. The
prognosis for congressional action is poor, however, suggesting that a second-best
solution is needed. To achieve that end, the government should reverse its historic
position and treat a cash merger as commencing with a stock sale so that all parties can
access the elective tax treatment now reserved for the well-advised.

